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Abstract  The  objective  of  this  theoretical--empirical  study  is  to  investigate  the  bidirectional
relationship  between  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  and  Financial  Performance  in  Spanish  listed
companies. A  complete  theoretical  framework  --  based  on  agency,  stewardship,  dependency
resources,  and  stakeholder  theories  --  provides  the  basis  for  the  conceptual  model.  An  impor-
tant contribution  is  the  use  of  a  social  behavioral  index  formed  by  four  components:  Global
Reporting Initiative  participation,  Dow  Jones  Sustainability  Index  ﬁrm  inclusion,  Good  Corporate
Governance  Recommendations  compliance,  and  Global  Compact  signee.
The conclusions  drawn  from  the  empirical  study  performed  on  the  companies  registered  on
the Madrid  Stock  Exchange  demonstrate  positive  relationships  in  both  directions,  namely  that
the social  is  proﬁtable  and  that  the  proﬁtable  is  social,  thereby  originating  a  positive  feedback
virtuous  circle.
The  results  of  this  analysis  have  practical  applications  in  the  boardroom;  they  are  proof
that all  social  policies  increment  ﬁnancial  resources,  and  vice  versa,  that  increased  ﬁnancial
performances  lead  to  greater  social  beneﬁts.  As  a  consequence,  this  paper  encourages  all  board
members  to  seriously  weigh  investing  ﬁnancial  resources  in  developing  policies  that  boost  the
levels of  social  behavior  components  in  order  to  contribute  globally  to  the  improvement  of
society.
© 2015  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
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ompany  concerns  are  increasingly  focused  toward  issues
f  social  content,  all  the  while  resolving  to  maximize  eco-
omic  performance  in  order  to  satisfy  shareholders  and  act
n  a  socially  responsible  manner  for  the  beneﬁt  of  society
s  a  whole.  Social,  economic  and  environmental  concerns
re  forcing  companies  to  integrate  systems  that  take  into
ccount  the  observance  of  the  law  in  all  spheres,  and  also
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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ocus  on  the  common  good  for  society  in  general  and  stake-
olders  in  particular.
Shareholders,  through  the  general  assemblies,  exercise
heir  role  in  demanding  ethical  attitudes  and  behaviors  at
he  corporate  level,  thereby  exercising  strong  inﬂuence  on
he  formulation  of  strategies  by  the  board  of  directors.
hey  require  transparency,  efﬁciency  and  efﬁcacy  on  the
art  of  managers,  in  order  to  obtain  economic  beneﬁts
nd,  thus  ensure  the  continuity  of  the  company  over  the
ong  term,  whilst  demanding  that  socially  responsible  poli-
ies  be  integrated  into  the  companies  themselves  (Pava
nd  Krausz,  1996).  From  an  academic  point  of  view,  there
xists  an  increasing  demand  in  developing  business  ethics  --
y  integrating  as  research  objective  the  detection  of  illicit
usinesses  contrary  to  social  rights  (Byrne,  2011).  Business
thics  is  by  no  means  a  recent  development,  a  present-
ay  trendy  topic;  studies  demonstrate  that  conformation
o  ethical  standards  and  principles  has  been  an  issue  per-
isting  through  the  ages  and  withstanding  the  test  of  time
Michalos,  2008).
Presently  CSR  and  business  ethics  are  intricately  related
rom  both  an  academic  and  practical  perspective.  We
onsider  a  variety  of  CSR  deﬁnitions  proposed  in  the
iterature  and  by  several  institutions  that  emphasize  a  vol-
ntary  involvement  in  the  solution  of  certain  social  issues;
ocial  responsiveness  is  fundamentally  multidimensional  and
mbodies  a  large  and  varied  range  of  corporate  behavior  in
elation  to  its  resources,  processes  and  outputs  (Waddock
nd  Graves,  1997).
A  majority  of  research  to  date  on  this  theme  has  focused
n  the  relationship  between  Corporate  Social  Responsibil-
ty  (CSR)  and  Financial  Performance  (FP).  Generally,  these
ndings  show  this  relationship  to  be  positive,  however  there
xists  a  lack  of  homogeneity  in  the  results.  The  reasons  are
wofold:  (1)  the  absence  of  a  general  method  that  serves
s  yardstick  for  comparative  studies,  and  (2)  there  exists
o  rigorous  method  of  measuring  return  on  CSR  (Gjølberg,
009).
Our  work  strives  to  ﬁll  this  existing  gap  in  the  literature;
nd  with  this  aim  we  set  two  main  objectives:  First,  to  deter-
ine  if  Financial  Performance  depends  on  Corporate  Social
esponsibility,  represented  as  a  combined  function  of  four
istinct  social  variables:  Global  Reporting  Initiative  (GRI)
articipation,  Dow  Jones  Sustainability  Index  (DJSI)  ﬁrm
nclusion,  Good  Corporate  Governance  (CG)  recommenda-
ions  compliance,  and  Global  Compact  (GC)  signee.  Second,
o  test  the  inverse  relationship,  social  responsibility  depend-
nce  on  ﬁnancial  performance,  using  a  CSR  index,  or  Social
ehaviour  Index,  that  includes  the  previous  four  social  varia-
les  as  equal  weighted  components  aggregated  in  a  unique
alue.  In  both  cases  ﬁnancial  performance  is  represented  by
hree  ﬁnancial  variables  or  ratios,  namely  ROA  (return  on
ssets),  ROE  (return  on  equity)  and  Tobin’s  Q.
A  further  objective  sets  to  reveal  whether  ﬁrms  are
nterested  in  developing  CSR  from  an  economic  standpoint,
ased  on  the  fact  that  it  represents  an  important  engine  of
evelopment  and  contributes  toward  improving  social  and
nvironmental  protection.  As  collateral  beneﬁt,  investors
nd  consumers  can  better  evaluate  companies  that  take  into
ccount  CSR  actions.  The  projection  of  an  image  of  social
esponsibility,  by  helping  to  shape  customers  of  the  entity,
ffects  the  evaluation  of  the  service  received.  In  their  role
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s  social  agents,  companies  are  expected  to  meet  commit-
ents  that  go  beyond  strictly  business  matters.
Our  study  will  be  centered  on  Spain,  a  representative
ember  of  the  group  of  developed  countries,  where  such
 study  has  yet  to  be  carried  out  and  where  the  increas-
ng  internationalization  of  the  country’s  largest  ﬁrms  should
learly  illustrate  the  importance  of  adopting  far  reaching
orporate  social  policies.
In  shedding  light  on  the  key  interplay  between  CSR  and  its
P,  we  expect  the  results  of  our  work  to  go  a  long  way  toward
onvincing  corporate  boards  that  social  policies  must  form
n  integral  part  of  overall  company  strategy.  Taken  from  a
takeholders’  perspective,  the  study  should  also  be  of  value
o  all  interest  groups  that  lay  claim,  or  stake,  in  a  corpo-
ation’s  wellbeing.  Finally,  both  corporations  and  society  at
arge  beneﬁt  from  increased  awareness  in  company  social
ndertakings,  reconciling  at  times  different  viewpoints  as
o  whether  corporate  proﬁts  are  adequately  distributed
mongst  all  stakeholders.
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  ‘Theoretical  frame-
ork’  section  deals  with  the  theoretical  framework,
resenting  the  main  administrative  theories  and  concepts  on
hich  the  study  is  based.  We  introduce  CG,  CSR  and  FP  as  the
hree  key  pillars  sustaining  our  conceptual  model.  ‘Proposed
odel  and  formulation  of  hypotheses’  section  establishes
he  two  basic  hypotheses  that  address  the  question  as  to
hether  CSR  explains  FP  and  vice  versa.  In  ‘Empirical  study’
ection,  we  empirically  test  our  hypotheses  using  the  Social
ehaviour  Index  for  measuring  CSR  and  the  three  ﬁnan-
ial  ratios  representing  FP.  The  last  section  consists  of  the
onclusion  and  suggests  future  lines  of  research.
heoretical framework
eview  of  the  main  theories  applicable  to  the  study
he  theoretical  framework  underlying  this  work  includes
 number  of  different  theories.  Their  distinct  approaches
re  all  pertinent  in  some  measure.  We  can  distinguish,  on
he  one  hand,  the  set  of  theories  applicable  to  the  rela-
ion  between  CSR,  FP,  and  CG  --  conforming  the  conceptual
odel  of  our  study  --  and,  on  the  other  hand,  stakeholder
heory  --  the  unique  theory  --  that  supports  the  relation
etween  CSR  and  FP.  The  integration  of  these  diverse  con-
tructs  enriches  the  literature  and  strengthens  the  proposed
eneric  model.  Fig.  1  illustrates  the  theoretical  framework
sed  in  the  study.
Agency  theory  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976;  Fama,  1980;
ama  and  Jensen,  1983) establishes  that  the  principal
shareholder)  and  the  agent  (manager)  have  opposing  inter-
sts  that  may  trigger  conﬂicts  which  will  interfere  with  the
mooth  running  of  the  company.  In  contrast,  stewardship
heory  offers  an  alternative  view,  which  states  that  there
xist  ethical  and  professional  motives  that  will  override  and
revent  conﬂicts  of  interest  from  developing  between  the
rincipal  and  agent  (Muth  and  Donaldson,  1998).  This  latter
heory  assumes  that  managers  are  good  resource  managers
Donaldson,  1990;  Donaldson  and  Davis,  1991,  1994)  who  will
chieve  good  business  track  records  thanks  to  their  efforts
Davis  et  al.,  1997);  in  addition,  managers,  as  honest  people
Donaldson  and  Preston,  1995),  endeavor  to  not  hinder  the
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Source:  Own  elaboration.
objectives  of  the  shareholders  (Donaldson  and  Davis,  1994)
in  order  to  preserve  their  reputation.  Both  agency  and  stew-
ardship  theories,  in  taking  the  board  of  directors  as  principal
and  the  executive  body  as  agent,  come  into  conﬂict  with
regard  to  the  consideration  of  who  is  responsible  for  the
policies  of  socially  responsible  investment  and  the  actions
of  CSR.
Resource  dependency  theory  analyzes  the  relationships
and  interactions  of  the  companies  with  other  agents,  valu-
ing  their  contributions  on  the  basis  of  the  extent  to  which
they  facilitate  the  maximization  of  its  performance  (Pfeffer,
1973;  Pfeffer  and  Salancik,  1978).  The  board  of  directors
plays  a  key  role  in  obtaining  important  resources  for  the
company,  such  as  ﬁnancial  resources  that  can  later  be  ear-
marked  for  socially  responsible  investments  and  actions.
Also  of  interest,  the  approach  offered  by  the  theoretical
institutional  perspective  developed  by  Scott  (2001), which
holds  that  all  social  participants  seek  legitimacy  and  in  so
doing  help  develop  legitimate  rules  within  the  institutional
environment  (Judge  et  al.,  2010).  If  companies  ﬁx  as  their
objective  the  quest  for  legitimacy  over  economic  efﬁciency
(Carver,  2010)  and  if  CG  blends  in  an  economic,  cultural,  and
social  context,  then  social  welfare  and  the  balance  of  the
interest  groups  must  take  center  stage  (Hess  and  Warren,
2008;  Johanson  and  Östergren,  2010).
All  of  the  above  theories,  in  considering  CG  as  responsible
for  the  actions  of  CSR  and  the  policies  of  socially  responsi-
ble  investments,  underlie  and  support  the  interrelationship
between  company  CSR  and  FP.  However,  stakeholder  the-
ory,  an  integrative  and  holistic  perspective,  as  it  considers
society  in  general,  serves  as  main  pillar  for  our  research.
Good  CSR  policy  together  with  the  appropriate  behavior
of  the  board  of  directors  will  improve  ﬁnancial  proﬁtabil-
ity,  and  favor  shareholders,  employees,  customers,  suppliers
and  all  other  agents  likely  to  be  affected  by  the  decisions
taken  by  the  company.  The  academic  debates  surround-
ing  this  approach  (Freeman,  1984;  Donaldson  and  Preston,
1995;  Donaldson,  1999;  Jones  and  Wicks,  1999;  Preston  and
Donaldson,  1999;  Sternberg,  1999;  Pesqueux  and  Damak-
Ayadi,  2005;  Kaufman  and  Englander,  2011)  have  developed
over  time.  The  descriptive,  instrumental  and  normative
aspects  of  the  theory  are  ever  present  in  research.  Although
a
v
scal  framework.
uite  different  from  each  other,  as  pointed  out  by  Donaldson
1999),  they  are  complementary  and  able  to  explain  the
nterplay  between  CSR  and  FP.
The  descriptive  aspect  provides  a  notion  for  the  deﬁni-
ion  of  a  company;  Donaldson  and  Preston  (1995)  describe  it
s  a constellation  of  cooperative  and  competitive  interests
ith  intrinsic  value.  From  an  instrumental  point  of  view  the
heory  provides  the  framework  for  examining  the  companies
nd  analyzing  the  relationship  between  management  and
he  achievement  of  performance  objectives  (Surroca  et  al.,
010);  it  advocates  that  companies  establish  an  order  of  pri-
rity  amongst  its  interest  groups  and  favor  those  who  are
est  positioned.  Thus,  the  level  of  effort  in  CSR  exercised
y  companies  depends  largely  on  the  relative  importance  of
heir  interest  groups  (Choi  et  al.,  2010).  This  contrasts  with
he  normative  aspect  of  this  theory,  which  focuses  on  the
egitimacy  of  the  company’s  interest  groups  and  the  value
f  their  interests,  always  worthy  of  attention  regardless  of
ategory  (Kaufman  and  Englander,  2011).  Consequently,  it
ecomes  imperative  to  introduce  good  CG  recommendations
s  an  important  element  of  CSR.
orporate  governance  and  its  implications
orporate  Governance  arises  as  a  result  of  the  separa-
ion  between  ownership  of  the  business  and  its  control
n  response  to  a  system  by  which  companies  are  directed
nd  controlled  (Cadbury,  2000).  Agency  theory  (Jensen  and
eckling,  1976;  Fama,  1980;  Fama  and  Jensen,  1983)  pro-
ides  the  rationale  for  the  possible  conﬂict  that  can  develop
etween  the  principal  (shareholders)  and  the  agent  (man-
gement).  As  explained  by  Guerras  Martín  and  Navas  López
2004)  the  problem  of  owner  control  on  management  and  the
echanisms  available  to  exercise  that  control  is  known  as
G;  a  speciﬁc  mechanism  of  governance,  such  as  the  board
f  directors,  plays  a  relevant  role  in  disciplining  and  advis-
ng  management  on  taking  the  most  appropriate  decisions
t  every  juncture  and  for  each  organization  (Cuervo,  2002).
The  board  of  directors  must  ensure  the  long-term
iability  of  the  company  by  maximizing  proﬁtability  for
hareholders  (Daily  and  Dalton,  1994)  and  harmonizing  the
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nterests  of  the  company  with  those  of  the  interest  groups
Coombs  and  Gilley,  2005).  The  decisions  taken  by  the  board
ill  lead  to  distinct  levels  of  FP,  the  possible  implementation
f  CSR  policies  (Ingley  et  al.,  2011),  and  the  deployment  of  a
articular  strategy  of  socially  responsible  investment  (Mill,
006).
As  a  result  of  the  increasing  importance  of  ethical
ehavior  in  business  and  the  demand  for  transparency  and
nformation  by  shareholders,  corporate  codes  of  conduct
re  emerging  in  many  countries  (Amaeshi  and  Amao,  2009;
tiglbauer,  2010;  Mody  and  Mudoi,  2011).  Spain  published
he  directives  for  CG  in  listed  companies,  or  Olivencia  Code
CNMV,  1998),  in  response  to  the  social  demand  for  more
fﬁciency,  agility  and  transparency  from  the  companies.
he  Aldama  Report  (CNMV,  2003),  based  on  the  Olivencia
ode  was  published  in  2003;  this  was  followed  by  the  CNMV
2006)  approval  in  2006  of  the  Uniﬁed  Code  of  Good  Gov-
rnment  (UCGG),  requiring  listed  companies  to  submit  their
nnual  reports  on  CG  in  accordance  with  the  recommen-
ations  established  in  article  116  of  the  Securities  Market
ct.
The  UCGG  (CNMV,  2006)  clearly  lays  out  the  social  aspect
he  board  of  directors  of  listed  company  must  abide  by,
xpressing  that  all  directors  must  have  the  common  objec-
ive  of  defending  the  social  interest,  understanding  it  to
e  that  which  best  meets  the  expectations  of  investors,
lthough  not  implying  that  these  interests  must  be  pursed
t  ‘‘any  price’’.  Among  the  core  policies  and  strategies  the
oard  of  directors  takes  on  as  mission,  we  emphasize  that
elated  to  the  approval  of  CG  policy  and  CSR  (recommen-
ations  8.a.iv  and  8.a.v).  Company  compliance  with  these
nd  other  recommendations  (58  in  total)  is  disclosed  by  the
ublication  of  the  annual  report  on  CG,  speciﬁcally  in  the
nal  section,  which  deals  with  compliance,  or  lack  thereof
listing  motives).  The  total  number  of  UCGG  recommenda-
ions  basically  constitutes  corporate  CSR  ‘‘accountability’’
efore  society  in  general.
CSR  is  invariably  linked  to  the  seminal  work  of  Bowen
1953),  which  states  that  a  company’s  social  and  economic
esponsibilities  are  inseparable.  The  vision  that  incorpo-
ates  CSR  to  the  business  objective  does  not  refer  to
hat  companies  are  searching  for,  but  rather  to  how  they
re  going  about  it.  Achievement  includes  matters  related
ith  society  and  the  environment  in  all  dimensions  (Davis
nd  Blomstrom,  1975).  CSR’s  ﬁve  fundamental  principles
ccording  to  the  CSR  Observatory  (2010)1 are:  compliance
ith  legality;  universality,  that  is,  coverage  of  all  areas  of
ctivity;  the  obligation  to  accept  objective  ethical  commit-
ents;  its  manifestation  through  generated  impacts;  and,
nally,  its  orientation  toward  the  satisfaction  of  interest
roups.
CSR  has  been  deﬁned  in  many  ways  (Maak,  2008)  and  its
ontent  has  evolved  over  time  (Argandon˜a  and  Von  Weltzien
oivik,  2009).  However,  all  of  them  make  reference  to  both
he  importance  of  interest  groups  and  the  concern  for  social
nd  environmental  matters  (Maak  and  Pless,  2009;  Lu  and
iu,  2013).  The  Green  Book  of  the  European  Communities
1 The CSR Observatory was created in 2004 by a group of orga-
izations representing Spanish civil society with the objective of
avoring knowledge and compliance with CSR.
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ommission  (2001)  states  that  CSR  consists  not  only  of  a
ompany’s  voluntary  compliance  with  social  and  environ-
ental  issues,  but  also  its  respect  for  existing  rules  and
egulations  in  those  countries  where  it  operates;  and,  the
articipation  in  the  development  of  these  where  they  do
ot  exist.
For  McWilliams  and  Siegel  (2000)  CSR  consists  of  actions
hat  favor  social  wellbeing  beyond  the  interests  of  the  com-
any  or  the  stipulations  required  by  law.  Hence,  companies
hould  direct  their  efforts  toward  management  models  with
 greater  social  content,  notwithstanding  assuring  proﬁtabil-
ty,  the  zealous  respect  for  the  law,  standing  on  superior
oral  grounds,  and  defending  collective  interests.  This
oncept  is  embraced  by  those  organizations  that  believe
‘something  must  be  given  back’’  to  society  (Lindgreen
t  al.,  2009).
CG  and  CSR  are  two  concepts  that  have  been  studied
eparately  in  previous  literature,  (Bhimani  and  Soonawalla,
005)  and  the  relationships  between  the  two  generate  bene-
cial  synergies  (Jamali  et  al.,  2008;  Chan  et  al.,  2013).  From
 Spanish  UCGG  perspective,  the  functions  of  the  board  of
irectors  includes  defending  the  interests  of  all  sharehol-
ers,  albeit  always  respecting  the  law,  honoring  third  party
greements,  and  abiding  by  all  CSR  policies.  With  regard
o  the  relationship  between  these  two  ideas,  Harjoto  and  Jo
2011)  make  an  interesting  contribution:  the  authors  discov-
red  that  in  full  consistency  with  the  hypothesis  of  conﬂict
esolution,  the  choice  of  CSR  strategy  is  positively  associated
ith  the  characteristics  of  CG.  But,  more  importantly,  after
orrecting  the  CSR  measures  for  endogeneity,  the  results
howed  that  commitment  with  CSR  leads  to  improved  ﬁnan-
ial  returns.
The  existing  connection  between  CG  and  CSR  has
ontributed  to  the  development  of  regulations  on  CG,
ntroduced  in  some  European  countries  (Spain,  UCGG;
nited  Kingdom,  ‘‘Cadbury  Report’’;  France,  ‘‘The  Viénot’’;
nd,  Germany  ‘‘The  Gerhard  Cromme’’),  and  which  has
erved  to  clarify  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of  the
ompanies,  the  boards  of  directors,  and  the  shareholders
Rodríguez-Fernández,  2015).  In  Spain,  the  publication  of
odes  of  conduct  for  listed  companies  has  provided  the
pportunity  for  shareholders  to  assume  their  role  as  owners
f  the  company  (Albareda  and  Balaguer,  2009).  Attitudes  of
ull  commitment  with  society  and  the  environment  together
ith  ethical  codes  of  conduct  have  led  to  business  strategies
hat  cover  manifold  CSR  policies,  adding  yet  more  respon-
ibilities  to  the  board  of  directors,  ever  involved  with  such
ssues  as  human  rights,  bribery  and  corruption,  and  global
hange  (Elkington,  2006).  In  Asia,  Welford  (2007)  revises
hese  links  and  expresses  that  CSR  practices  are  often  based
n  good  standards  of  CG  providing  a  solid  CSR  foundation  --
y  creating  value  added  relationships  with  all  stakeholders.
Companies  must  understand  CSR  management  as  a  way
o  develop  proper  CG  (Spence  and  Perrini,  2009).  By  inte-
rating  CSR  within  the  activities  of  companies,  different
orms,  guidelines,  management  systems,  and  other  stan-
ards  have  risen  to  the  forefront.  The  implementation  of
anagement  systems  allows  for  the  development  of  CSR.
he  Global  Reporting  Initiative  (GRI)  promotes  the  draft-
ng  of  CSR  reports,  so-called  sustainability  reports,  and  the
lobal  Compact,  are  statements  of  commitments  with  soci-
ty,  the  environment,  and  development.
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Albareda  (2013)  afﬁrms  CSR  reporting  standards  are
converging  toward  homogeneous  guidelines  under  the  pre-
dominance  of  the  GRI  model;  the  consolidation  of  this
standard  is  demonstrated  by  Boesso  et  al.  (2013), who
collected  data  --  in  accordance  with  the  GRI  guideline  --
related  to  CSR.  Wilburn  and  Wilburn  (2013)  examined  the  GRI
reporting  guidelines  and  its  applicability  to  CSR  principles,
detailing  its  suitability  in  allowing  companies  to  formulate
CSR  strategies  and  helping  stakeholders  evaluate  those  same
strategies.
With  respect  to  the  Global  Compact  commitments  as
part  of  the  ongoing  CSR  drive,  Knudsen  (2011)  ﬁnds  that
ﬁrms  from  countries  with  international  economies  are  more
willing  to  abide  by  the  Global  Compact  speciﬁcations.
Cetindamar  (2007),  and  Ruggie  (2004)  illustrate  how  com-
panies  that  have  participated  many  years  in  the  Global
Compact  regard  their  CSR  involvement  as  having  had  a
strong  inﬂuence  on  their  market  performance  and  creation
of  value.
Finally,  Strand  (2013)  demonstrates  that  companies  with
a  stronger  focus  on  CSR  are  three  times  more  likely  to  be
included  in  Dow  Jones  Sustainability  Index  (DJSI  in  the  New
York  Stock  Exchange).  Lopez  et  al.  (2007)  in  their  empirical
analysis  relate  inclusion  in  the  DJSI  with  active  CSR  policies.
Corporate  social  responsibility  and  ﬁnancial
performance
From  a  theoretical  perspective,  stakeholder  theory  (McGuire
et  al.,  1988)  sets  the  framework  for  the  relationship
between  CSR  and  FP;  interest  groups  claim  company
resources,  and  in  so  doing  implicitly  require  proper  com-
pany  behavior,  such  as  consideration  for  the  environment
and  concern  for  fair  and  just  labor  relations.  In  those  cases
in  which  the  company  does  not  act  with  social  responsibil-
ity,  resultant  costs  could  become  signiﬁcant  and  represent
a  ﬁnancial  burden  likely  to  reduce  proﬁts,  leading  to  a
less  socially  aware  entity.  In  contrast,  if  companies  that
adopt  socially  responsible  policies  are  more  proﬁtable,  then
socially  responsible  investments  will  provide  an  incentive  for
businesses  to  increase  investments  in  CSR  programs  (Pava,
2008).
Numerous  studies  (Cochran  and  Wood,  1984;  Aupperle
et  al.,  1985;  McGuire  et  al.,  1988;  Waddock  and  Graves,
1997;  McWilliams  and  Siegel,  2000;  Orlitzky  et  al.,  2003;
Smith,  2003;  Ortas  et  al.,  2014)  testify  to  the  ever-present
dichotomy  between  CSR  and  FP;  however,  there  exist  no
clear-cut  conclusions  that  clarify  the  positive,  negative  or
inexistent  correlation.  The  reasons  lie  in  the  imperfections
of  the  studies  (caused  by  problems  in  measuring  FP  and  CSR),
the  omission  of  signiﬁcant  latent  variables  in  the  formula-
tion  of  the  models,  the  absence  of  causality  analysis,  the
lack  of  rigor  in  the  methodology,  and  by  a  shortfall  in  the
theory  underpinning  the  study  (Margolis  and  Walsh,  2003).
Nonetheless,  Stanwick  and  Stanwick  (1998)  reviewed  stud-
ies  that  examined  the  effects  of  CSR  on  FP  and  concluded
that  there  exists  a  positive,  albeit  weak,  relationship.Moreover,  other  authors  (Wood  and  Jones,  1995;  Akpinar
et  al.,  2008)  have  argued  about  the  existence  of  a
‘‘misalignment’’  problem  in  the  interest  groups  as  a  cause
for  the  variance  in  the  results;  the  solution  lies  in  identifying
l
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he  major  interest  groups  most  important  to  the  company.
n  this  regard,  Alniacik  et  al.  (2011)  conclude  that  posi-
ive  information  on  company  CSR  leads  to  both  employment
esirability  at  the  ﬁrm,  and  to  an  improvement  in  purchase
nd  investment  intentions.  Akpinar  et  al.’s  (2008)  contribu-
ion  settled  the  question  as  to  whether  all  interest  groups
eld  the  same  importance;  his  study,  based  on  interest  group
heory,  concluded  that  the  relationship  was  positive  if  the
easurement  of  CSR  took  into  account  the  relative  impor-
ance  of  each  interest  group.
Customers,  employees,  suppliers,  shareholders,  and
ociety  as  a  whole  represent  interest  groups  for  the  corpo-
ations;  however,  instrumental  theory  posits  that  investors
ean  toward  those  companies  with  superior  social  behavior
hen  all  other  factors  remain  constant,  and  the  information
n  social  responsibility  is  independently  available.  The  the-
ry  further  postulates  (Choi  et  al.,  2010) that  the  level  of
ffort  the  companies  dedicate  to  the  different  areas  of  CSR
epends  on  the  importance  given  to  them  by  each  of  the
nterest  groups.
In the  same  sense,  Brammer  and  Pavelin  (2006)  introduce
he  aggregate  concept  of  corporate  reputation  that  reﬂects
he  perceptions  of  a  host  of  individual  stakeholders.  Demon-
trating  a  high  degree  of  social  responsibility  may  therefore
equire  a  diverse  range  of  social  activities,  each  of  which
ay  have  a  separately  identiﬁable  impact  upon  reputation.
urthermore,  stakeholder  groups  have  differing  expecta-
ions  regarding  ﬁrm  behavior  (Fombrun  and  Shanley,  1990),
nd  the  salience  of  each  stakeholder  group  varies  across
ndustries.  Therefore,  the  impact  of  CSR  activism  on  rep-
tation  is  jointly  contingent  upon  which  type  of  CSR  activity
s  undertaken.
Sternberg  (1999)  points  out  that  the  interest  group
pproach  presents  two  major  drawbacks:  ﬁrst,  the  need  to
esolve  the  conﬂict  between  the  values,  objectives,  and
nterests  of  the  stakeholders;  and  second,  the  need  to
orrectly  account  for  responsibility,  stressing  that  in  the  tra-
itional  corporation  the  directors  are  accountable  to  the
hareholders,  whereas  the  employees  and  other  agents  are
esponsible,  through  the  top  level  executives,  to  the  direc-
ors.  However,  this  doctrine  explicitly  rejects  both  types  of
esponsibilities.  This  rejection  is  one  of  the  distinguishing
eatures  of  the  stakeholder  approach,  which  instead  pro-
oses  a  diffuse  and  ineffective  structure  of  responsibilities.
McWilliams  and  Siegel  (2000)  reach  an  interesting  conclu-
ion:  the  lack  of  correlation  between  ﬁnancial  proﬁtability
nd  CSR  is  caused  by  errors  in  the  statistical  analyses  and
he  non-inclusion  of  investment  in  the  Research  &  Devel-
pment  (R&D)  variable;  the  latter  correlates  modestly  with
SR.  They  point  out  that  investment  in  R&D  correlates  with
oth  FP  and  CSR;  this  correlation  is  due  to  the  relationship
etween  investment  in  R&D  and  innovation  of  products  and
ervices.
The  reviews  of  Choi  et  al.  (2010)  show  the  results  to
e  mostly  positive,  although  some  are  negative,  mixed,  or
ncorrelated.  Margolis  and  Walsh  (2003)  reached  the  same
onclusion  in  the  reviews  of  127  studies,  carried  out  between
972  and  2002;  the  results  showed  a  mostly  positive  corre-
ation  independently  of  whether  CSR  was  the  independent
109  studies)  or  the  dependent  variable  (18  studies).
A  positive  correlation  was  observed  in  those  studies
n  which  the  instrumental  theory  of  interest  groups  was
1 M.  Rodriguez-Fernandez
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sed  to  solve  the  problem  of  misalignment.  Based  on  the
ork  of  Akpinar  et  al.  (2008),  and  taking  as  reference
he  KEJI  Index,2 Choi  et  al.  (2010)  analyzed  a  sample  of
222  Korean  companies  between  the  years  2002  and  2008
n  order  to  perform  their  statistical  analysis  --  using  two
ypes  of  indices  to  measure  the  social  behavior  of  corpora-
ions:  they  calculated  ﬁrst,  an  equal  weighted  responsibility
ndex  (‘‘Equal-weighted  CSR  Index’’),  and  second,  an  index
eighted  according  to  the  importance  of  the  interest  groups
‘‘Stakeholder-weighted  CSR  Index’’).  The  outcome  showed
 positive  relationship  between  FP  and  the  second  index,
llustrating  that  when  companies  focus  their  CSR  policies
oward  those  interest  groups  that  hold  greater  importance
or  the  company,  ﬁnancial  results  improve.
McGuire  et  al.  (1988)  introduced  a  time  lag  factor  to
urther  investigate  the  relationship  between  ﬁnancial  pro-
tability,  over  several  years,  and  social  behavior.  Using  as
 measure  of  CSR  a  Fortune  magazine  corporate  behavior
ndex,  they  concluded  that  CSR  showed  a  higher  correla-
ion  with  ﬁnancial  results  of  previous  years.  CSR  vs.  ﬁnancial
esults  of  subsequent  years  displayed  a  lower  correlation.
Of  note,  Schuler  and  Cording  (2006),  while  recognizing
he  profound  importance  of  the  Corporate  Social  Perfor-
ance  (CSP)  and  corporate  FP  linkage,  alert  to  the  unclear
ature  of  the  relationship.  They  suggest  that  (1)  empirical
hortcomings  may  distort  the  CSP-FP  relationship,  and  (2)
arge  deﬁciencies  exist  in  the  theoretical  models  used  (most
ssume  a  direct  link  between  CSP  and  FP).  However,  in  deﬁn-
ng  the  CSP-FP  link  and  its  constructs  in  greater  detail,  they
dvance  how  CSP  leads  FP.
Recently,  Callan  and  Thomas  (2009)  respond  to  these
ssues  in  an  updated  study  of  this  relationship  by  examin-
ng  two  different  approaches  to  measuring  CSR,  controlling
or  key  variables  identiﬁed  in  the  literature,  and  testing  for
he  non-linearity  of  certain  variables.  Their  main  conclusion
sserts  that  a  positive  CSR--FP  relationship  exists.
The  main  conclusions  drawn  after  this  extensive  review
f  the  existing  literature  supports  the  selection  of  the  CSR
nd  FP  variables  used  to  build  the  models  of  the  empiri-
al  study.  In  accordance  with  the  exposed  studies  outlined
bove,  and  ﬁlling  the  gap  in  the  existing  Spanish  literature
here  the  bi-directional  CSR--FP  relationship  has  not  been
reviously  measured,  and  taking  into  account  that  all  com-
anies  must  satisfy  CSR,  thereby  accounting  to  society  as  a
hole  as  suggested  by  stakeholder  theory,  we  would  expect
reater  CSR  to  be  positively  related  with  higher  levels  of  FP
nd  vice  versa.
Therefore,  we  propose  the  following  hypotheses:
ypothesis  1.  Companies  displaying  greater  CSR  behavior
chieve  higher  ﬁnancial  proﬁtability.
ypothesis  2.  The  most  proﬁtable  companies  are  those
hat  adopt  superior  CSR  behavior.To  test  the  two  hypotheses  we  propose  two  complemen-
ary  models:  thus,  we  test  the  bi-directional  relationships
2 KEJI (Korea Economic Justice Institute Index) refers to a Korean
ndex developed by one of the leading NGO’s in the country.
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ource:  Own  elaboration.
etween  CSR  and  FP;  and,  seek  to  clarify  the  crux  of  the
elationship.
roposed model and formulation of
ypotheses
ollowing  the  literature  review,  we  formulate  a  conceptual
ase  model  comprised  of  the  interdependent  relationships
etween  the  parameters  previously  outlined:  CG,  from
hich  concrete  actions  in  CSR  are  derived  and  given  lev-
ls  of  FP  are  determined;  and  the  mutual  interdependencies
etween  CSR  and  FP.  A  further  element  of  our  model  consists
f  compliance  with  the  recommendations  of  Good  Corporate
overnance,  a task  of  the  board  of  directors.  See  graphical
epresentation  in  Fig.  2.
Given  this  generic  conceptual  model  we  will  derive  subset
odels  1  and  2,  and  focus  on  testing  statistically  the  rela-
ionship  between  CSR  and  FP.  Basing  our  research,  on  the
ne  hand  on  Stakeholder  theory,  as  done  by  McGuire  et  al.
1988)  and  Karagiorgos  (2010),  and  on  the  other  hand  on  the
nstrumental  approach,  following  Akpinar  et  al.  (2008), Choi
t  al.  (2010)  and  Harjoto  and  Jo  (2011),  we  expect  to  ﬁnd
 positive  relationship  between  CSR  and  FP  --  in  agreement
ith  the  published  studies  by  Margolis  and  Walsh  (2003),  Choi
t  al.  (2010)  and  Karagiorgos  (2010).
The  equation  for  Model  1  is  as  follows:
P  =  c  +  b1.GRI  +  b2.DJSI  +  b3.COMPL  RECOM  +  b4.GC
+  b5.LNASSET  +  D
The  dependent  variable,  FP,  as  used  by  other  authors  in
heir  studies  (Guest,  2009;  Jackling  and  Johl,  2009;  Crespí,
010),  is  represented  by:  ROA  (Return  on  Assets),  equal  to
perating  proﬁt  before  depreciation  and  provisions  divided
y  total  assets;  ROE  (Return  on  equity),  the  operating  proﬁt
efore  depreciation  and  provisions  divided  by  stockholders
quity;  and  Tobin’s  Q,  the  market  value  of  the  share  divided
y  its  book  value  (Perfect  and  Wiles,  1994).
Social  responsibility  and  ﬁnancial  performance:  The  role  of  good
Table  1  Variables  used  in  Model  1  of  the  study.
Social  variables
(Corporate  Social
Responsibility  used
as independent
variables)
Financial  variables
(Financial
Performance  used
as  dependent
variables)
Control
variable
GRI  ROA  LNASSET
DJSI ROE
COMPL  RECOM  QTOBIN
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Source:  Own elaboration.
Independent  variables  GRI,  DJSI,  COMPL  RECOM,  and  GC,
deﬁne  the  dimension  of  CSR.  LNASSET  is  used  as  control
variable  in  agreement  with  the  practice  of  other  authors
(McWilliams  and  Siegel,  2000;  Choi  et  al.,  2010;  Harjoto  and
Jo,  2011)  which  include  company  size  by  taking  the  natural
logarithm  of  the  assets  (see  Table  1).
GRI  (Global  Report  Initiative)  indicates  the  valuation  of
the  sustainability  report  according  to  guide  G-3.  Variable  GRI
is  included  because  (1)  of  its  universal  character,  and  (2)  it
allows  the  classiﬁcation  of  companies.  Its  widespread  use  in
the  European  Union  and  in  countries  of  the  OECD  makes  it
a  rigorous  and  comprehensive  indicator  (Hedberg  and  Von
Malmborg,  2003;  Frias-Aceituno  et  al.,  2013;  Legendre  and
Coderre,  2013).
DJSI  (Dow  Jones  Sustainability  Index)  indicates  if  the
company  belongs  to  the  DJSI.  Its  universality  and  reputation
amongst  the  sustainability  indices  make  it  a  good  variable
for  measuring  CSR.
COMPL RECOM  (Compliance  of  the  Recommendations  of
Good  Corporate  Governance)  indicates  the  extent  of  compli-
ance  with  the  recommendations  of  the  UCGG.  It  gives  an
idea  of  the  importance  that  companies  grant  to  one  of  their
interest  groups,  the  shareholders  (58  recommendations  in
total  can  be  seen  in  the  F  section  of  the  reports  of  Good
Corporate  Governance  of  the  listed  Spanish  companies).
GC  (Global  Compact)  indicates  if  companies  have  signed
the  Global  Compact.  This  variable  has  been  selected  as  one
of  the  CSR  measures  because  the  forum  of  CSR  experts  of
the  Ministry  of  Labor3 has  embraced  it,  together  with  others
such  as  GRI,  as  signiﬁcant.
Consequently,  the  four  selected  social  variables  are  rep-
resentative  of  the  commitment  that  companies  have  with
society,  the  environment,  and  with  its  interest  groups  in  gen-
eral.  Additionally,  by  including  variable  COMPL  RECOM,  we
have  stressed  the  special  importance  all  stakeholders  hold
for  the  companies.  Other  rules  and  indices  that  exist  for
evaluating  CSR  have  not  been  considered,  either  because  of
the  inclusion  of  a  related  parameter,  its  limited  acceptance,
and/or  the  difﬁculty  in  ﬁnding  the  corresponding  data.
From  Model  1  we  derive  the  following  sub-hypotheses:H1.1  ((GRI)).  Companies  obtaining  a  higher  rating  in  the
GRI  index  achieve  better  ﬁnancial  results.
3 The forum of CSR experts, founded in 2005, consisted of rep-
resentatives from the Public Administrations, Civil Society, and
Universities.
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1.2  ((DJSI)).  Companies  included  in  the  DJSI  achieve  bet-
er  ﬁnancial  results.
1.3  ((COMPL  RECOM)).  The  greater  the  compliance  with
he  recommendations  of  good  CG,  the  better  the  ﬁnancial
esults.
1.4  ((GC)). Companies  that  sign  the  Global  Compact
chieve  better  ﬁnancial  results.
Model  2,  in  agreement  with  the  possible  bidirectional
ature  of  the  relationship  proposed  by  a  number  of  authors
McGuire  et  al.,  1988;  Margolis  and  Walsh,  2003),  questions
hether  the  superior  ﬁnancial  returns  of  Spanish  compa-
ies  have  an  impact  on  their  social  behavior.  Under  this
pproach,  the  reverse  model  accounts  for  the  inherent  dif-
culty  of  statistical  models  that  include  CG  variables;  that
s,  we  attempt  avoiding  the  possible  endogeneity  between
he  dependent  and  independent  variables  (Shleifer  and
olfenzon,  2002;  Adams  et  al.,  2010).
The  studies  carried  out  in  other  countries,  which  have
erved  as  a  standard  for  this  work,  have  generally  used  CSR
ndices  gathered  by  independent  agencies  for  evaluating  the
ocial  behavior  of  the  companies.  Choi  et  al.  (2010)  develop
heir  own  CSR  index,  based  on  the  KEJI  ﬁnancial  index.
he  study  of  McGuire  et  al.  (1988)  is  based  on  the  ranking
ompiled  by  Fortune  magazine  (Fortune  reputation  rating).
ther  works,  such  as  (Margolis  and  Walsh,  2003;  Gallego,
006),  are  based  on  reports  of  environmental  emissions,
nvironmental  practices,  or  social  actions  carried  out  by  the
ompanies  themselves.  Donker  et  al.  (2008)  also  study  the
elationship  between  ﬁnancial  return  and  corporate  ethics
n  listed  Canadian  companies.  Harjoto  and  Jo  (2011)  devel-
ped  a  proprietary  index  via  the  assessment  of  ﬁve  variables
hat  corresponded  to  the  community,  the  environment,  the
roducts,  the  diversity,  and  employment.  Hence,  we  believe
hat  our  proposed  index  is  both  justiﬁed  and  representative
f  the  social,  environmental  and  ethical  components  of  the
panish  companies.
In our  case  the  index,  similar  to  that  used  by  Hong  and
ndersen  (2011),  includes  four  components:  the  presenta-
ion  of  company  sustainability  reports  according  to  the  GRI
odel,  company  inclusion  in  the  DJSI,  company  compliance
ith  the  recommendations  of  good  CG,  and  the  signing  of
he  GC.
For  model  2,  we  propose  the  following  equation:
NDEX  =  c  +  b1.FP  +  b2.LNASSET  +  D
We  test  the  following  hypothesis:
2  ((ROE/ROA/QTOBIN)). Better  ﬁnancial  results  lead  to
etter  behavior  in  CSR.
The  independent  variable  FP,  ﬁnancial  performance,
akes  on  the  values  of  the  ratios  ROA,  ROE,  and  Tobin’s
;  and,  the  dependent  variable,  INDEX  as  proposed  by
he  authors,  represents  a  compound  value  consisting  of  an
qually  weighted  sum  of  the  values  of  the  four  selected
ariables  (GRI,  DJSI,  COMPL  RECOM  and  GC).  This  index
easures  the  ﬁrm’s  CSR  behavior,  as  performed  in  the  work
f  Belu  and  Manescu  (2013). LNASSET,  which  measures  the
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Table  2  Variables  used  in  Model  2  of  the  study.
Social  variable
(Corporate  Social
Responsibility
Index  used  as
dependent
variable)
Financial  variables
(Financial
Performance  used
as  independent
variables)
Control
variable
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Source:  Own elaboration.
ize  of  the  companies,  has  been  included  as  a  control  vari-
ble  --  similar  to  Model  1  (see  Table  2).
mpirical study
ethodology,  sample  and  data  collection
or  the  empirical  analysis  we  formulate  six  multivariate
egression  models:  three  for  Model  1  and  another  three  for
odel  2.  To  carry  out  the  statistical  analysis  we  ran  the
conometric  software,  Eviews  5.0,  widely  used  in  empirical
esearch.
The  sample  is  composed  of  Spanish  companies  listed  on
he  Madrid  Stock  Exchange  in  the  year  2009.  The  informa-
ion  was  obtained  from  the  web  pages  of  The  Madrid  Stock
xchange  (http://www.bolsamadrid.es)4 and  The  Securities
arket  National  Commission  (http://www.cnmv.es).5 Data
rom  Banks,  Savings  Banks  and  Financial  Institutions  were
xcluded  because  their  accounting  system  differs  from  that
sed  by  the  majority  of  the  companies;  this  would  have
aused  a  lack  of  homogeneity  in  the  calculation  of  the
nancial  ratios;  additionally,  other  authors  (Jackling  and
ohl,  2009)  that  have  performed  previous  studies  on  the
orporate-ﬁnancial  link  have  done  likewise.  The  data  of  the
nancial  variables  were  obtained  from  the  SABI6 database
nd  checked  with  the  AMADEUS7 database.  The  ﬁnal  sample
onsists  of  data  from  121  companies  (see  Annex  1).
To  assess  a  company’s  social  dimension  the  following
spects  have  been  taken  into  account:
GRI:  In  accordance  with  the  GRI  index  valuation,  we  pro-
ose  the  following  numerical  rating:  A+:  1;  A:  0.9;  B+:  0.8;
:  0.7;  C+:  0.6;  C:  0.5;  and,  if  no  GRI  Index:  0.  The  informa-
ion  was  gathered  from  the  GRI  website:  http://database.
lobalreporting.org.
DJSI:  Value  1  if  the  company  belongs  to  the  DJSI,  and  0
therwise.
COMPL  RECOM:  calculated  by  dividing  the  number  of
atisﬁed  recommendations  by  the  total  number  of  applied
4 The Spanish Markets and Stockmarkets Corp. (BME) integrates
he different companies overseeing and managing the Spanish stock
xchanges and ﬁnancial system.
5 The Securities Market National Commission (CNMV) is the regu-
ator in charge of supervising and inspecting all activity on the stock
xchanges.
6 SABI (Iberian Balances Analysis System): database containing
eneral and ﬁnancial information on Spanish companies.
7 Amadeus: database containing ﬁnancial information on both
ublic and private European companies.
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ecommendations  (58  in  2009).  We  suggest  assigning  the
alue  1  to  the  recommendations  met,  0.5  to  the  partly  met,
nd  0  points  to  the  explained  but  unmet.  The  data  have  been
btained  from  paragraph  F  (degree  of  follow-up  to  the  rec-
mmendations  of  CG)  of  The  Annual  Reports  on  CG  for  the
ompanies  in  the  sample  (year  2009)  in  accordance  with  the
CGG  (2006).
GC:  Takes  value  1  if  the  company  has  signed  the  Global
ompact,  and  0  otherwise.  The  data  proceed  from  The
lobal  Compact  Network,  Spain  webpage:  http://www.
actomundial.org.
The  index  variable,  employed  in  Model  2,  was  calculated
sing  the  equally  weighted  sum  of  the  four  variables,  as  per-
ormed  by  Belu  and  Manescu  (2013);  all  were  assigned  the
ame  weight  (0.25)  that  was  used  to  assess  CSR.
nalysis  and  results
he  statistical  analysis  performed  on  the  initial  sample  pro-
uced  no  valid  result.  The  correlations  indicated  very  low
alues,  and  none  of  the  model’s  proposed  equations  offered
n  explanation;  hence,  we  decided  to  reduce  the  sample
ize  and  test  with  a  speciﬁc  group  of  companies.
We  retested  by  selecting  a  sample  group  of  companies
eeting  speciﬁc  criteria;  we  discovered  that  companies  dis-
laying  a  sustainability  report  according  to  GRI  did  present
xplanatory  models.  By  ﬁltering  those  companies  that  met
he  criterion,  the  sample  size  was  reduced  to  107  compa-
ies.
The  descriptive  statistics  of  the  selected  sample  is
ncluded  in  Table  3.
Compliance  with  the  recommendations  of  CG  varies
etween  a  maximum  value  of  100%  and  a  minimum  of  73.6%,
ith  a  mean  of  89.3%.  Only  6  companies  comply  with  all
he  recommendations.  51.6  per  cent  of  the  companies  are
ncluded  in  the  DJSI  and  80%  have  signed  the  GC.  In  regards
o  the  GRI  report,  its  mean  equals  0.94.  Finally,  the  Index
ariable  has  a  minimum  value  of  a  35.9%  and  a  maximum
alue  of  99.6%,  with  the  mean  at  78.9%.  The  maximum  value,
9.6%,  corresponds  to  a  single  company  that  signed  the  GC,
ollowed  the  GRI  to  draft  the  sustainability  report,  belonged
o  the  DJSI,  and  fulﬁlled  98  per  cent  of  the  UCGG  recommen-
ations.
As  for  the  ﬁnancial  variables,  the  maximum  and  minimum
alues  of  ROE  are  35.8  and  −105.40;  for  ROA,  they  are  16.4
nd  −10.2;  and,  for  Tobin’s  Q  these  are  5.89  and  0.69.  The
espective  mean  values  are:  4.7,  2.04,  and  1.85.
In  Table  4, correlations  between  variables,  we  draw
ttention  to  the  high  correlation  values  for  Global  Compact
0.4832),  ROE  (0.5072),  and  ROA  (0.4170);  all  in  relation  to
he  compliance  with  Good  Corporate  Governance  variable.
Next,  we  analyzed  whether  the  equation  advanced  in
odel  1  was  explanatory  for  any  of  the  three  proposed  ﬁnan-
ial  ratios  (see  Table  5).
For  the  variable  ROE,  the  best  model  included  varia-
les  GRI  and  COMPL  RECOM.  The  model  was  signiﬁcant
Prob.  F  <  0.05)  and  explanatory;  and,  explained  43%
Adj.  R-squared  0.43)  of  the  behavior  of  the  independent
ariable.  Variables  GRI  and  COMPL  RECOM  were  signiﬁ-
ant  as  well  (Prob.  t  <  0.005).  The  model  did  not  present
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Table  3  Descriptive  statistics.
COMPL  RECOM  DJSI  GRI  GC  INDEX  ROE  ROA  QTOBIN
Mean  0.8934 0.5161  0.9387  0.8065  0.7887  4.7065  2.0419  1.8574
Median 0.8981  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.9049  10.8000  2.2000  1.3000
Maximum 1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.9955  35.8000  16.4000  5.8900
Minimum 0.7358  0.0000  0.5000  0.0000  0.3590  −105.4000  −10.2000  0.6900
St. deviation  0.6570  0.5080  0.1256  0.4016  0.2182  1.3534  27.4496  5.0058
Source:  Own elaboration.
Table  4  Correlations  between  variables.
COMPL  RECOM  DJSI  GRI  GC  INDEX  LNASSET  ROE  ROA  QTOBIN
COMPL  RECOM  1.0000
DJSI  0.1914  1.0000
GRI  0.1951  0.3555  1.0000
GC 0.4832  0.5060  0.2856  1.0000
INDEX 0.4371  0.8805  0.4970  0.8322  1.0000
LNASSET -0.0701  0.4952  0.2648  0.4594  0.5325  1.0000
ROE 0.5072  0.3605  0.5259  0.5090  0.5580  0.2243  1.0000
ROA 0.4170  0.3936  0.4245  0.3275  0.4724  0.1441  0.8211  1.0000
QTOBIN 0.1854  0.2303  0.2912  0.0157  0.1972  -0.1110  0.4552  0.6234  1.0000
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problems  of  multicollinearity,8 nor  heteroscedasticity9;  the
autocorrelation10 problem  was  corrected  by  including  the
term  AR  (1)  (following  the  Cochrane-Orcutt  model).
Several  estimates  were  carried  out  for  variable  ROA;  and,
as  with  variable  ROE,  the  best  results  were  offered  by  the
model  that  included  variables  GRI  and  COMPL  RECOM.  There
were  autocorrelation  problems,  however  they  were  over-
come.  The  two  variables  were  also  signiﬁcant,  but  the  full
model  explained  only  29.8%  of  the  result,  somewhat  less
than  that  obtained  for  ROE.
No  satisfactory  results  were  obtained  for  Tobin’s  Q  vari-
able.
In  the  Model  2  analysis  (see  Table  6),  the  models  for  ROE
(Adj.  R-squared  50.2%),  and  for  ROA  (Adj.  R-squared  44.8%)
are  signiﬁcant  and  explanatory  (Prob.  F  <  0.05);  however
this  was  not  the  case  when  considering  Tobins’  Q  variable.
Autocorrelation  problems  were  detected  under  both  ROA
and  ROE;  these  were  corrected  by  including  variable  AR
(1),  after  observing  with  the  Breusch-Godfrey  test  that  the
autocorrelation  was  of  ﬁrst  order.  In  both  cases,  the  cor-
rection  can  be  veriﬁed  by  checking  the  data  in  the  tables
(the  introduced  variable  AR  (1)  is  not  signiﬁcant  as  Prob.
t  <  0.05).
Endogeneity  has  been  resolved  in  both  models  1  and  2
through  the  application  of  Hausman’s  test  (Hausman,  1978;
Hausman  and  Taylor,  1981).
8 Multicollinearity is the existence of a linear relationship between
the independent variables.
9 Heteroscedasticity refers to the unequal variance between the
variables.
10 Autocorrelation problems were resolved by contrasting ROE and
ROA data from 2008.
M
H
s
rThe  hypotheses  initially  posed  are  conﬁrmed  after  car-
ying  out  the  statistical  analysis  on  those  companies  that
et  the  requirement  --  having  drafted  out  the  sustaina-
ility  report  -- according  to  the  GRI  guide.  Thus,  according
o  Model  1,  hypothesis  H1.1  and  H1.3  hold  for  variables
OE  and  ROA,  and  we  can  afﬁrm  that  (1)  those  companies
btaining  better  rating  on  sustainability  according  to  the
RI  Sustainability  Reporting  Guidelines  obtained  superior
nancial  results;  and  (2)  those  companies  enjoying  higher
ercentages  of  compliance  with  the  recommendations  of
CGG  present  better  ﬁnancial  results,  as  measured  by  ROE
nd  ROA.
According  to  the  results  of  Model  2,  we  can  also  con-
rm  the  second  hypothesis  for  variables  ROA  and  ROE;  and,
an  state  that  those  companies  achieving  the  best  results  in
erms  of  ROA  and  ROE  obtain  greater  Social  Behaviour  Index
alues  and,  as  a  consequence,  are  distinguished  for  adopting
etter  overall  CSR  policies.
In  none  of  the  models  did  we  ﬁnd  a correlation  for
obin’s  Q  ratio,  as  exhibited  in  Table  7.  In  this  respect,
cGuire  et  al.  (1988)  had  advised  of  using  accounting  ratios,
specially  ROA,  rather  than  market  or  risk  ratios,  for  FP
ariables,  deeming  them  better  predictors.  We  can  afﬁrm,
s  other  authors  (McGuire  et  al.,  1988;  Charlo  Molina  and
oya  Clemente,  2010;  Choi  et  al.,  2010;  Karagiorgos,  2010;
arjoto  and  Jo,  2011)  have  done,  that  the  expected  conclu-
ion  --  positive  sign  in  the  studied  relationships  -  has  been
eached.
The  main  results  (as  shown  in  Table  7)  are:Model  1  (direct  relation):  greater  values  for  GRI  and  for
COMPL  RECOM  lead  to  greater  values  of  ROA  and  ROE.
Model  2  (inverse  relation):  greater  values  for  ROA  and  ROE
imply  greater  value  of  Social  Behaviour  Index.
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Table  5  Model  1  results.
Variables  Results  of  the  Model  1  for  ROE  Results  of  Model  1  for  ROA
Coefﬁcient  Std.  error  T-statistic  Coefﬁcient  Std.  error  T-statistic
COMPL  RECOM  229.307  (0.0007)*** 59.036  3.884  35.392  (0.0073)** 12.129  2.918
GRI 93.426  (0.0030)*** 28.440  3.284  14.634  (0.0205)** 5.917  2.473
LNASSET 5.940  (0.0357)** 2.678  2.219  0.702  (0.2153)  0.552  1.271
C −342.940  (0.0000)  62.890  −5.453  −45.591  (0.0007)  12.795  −3.876
AR(1) 0.394  (0.0505)  0.192  2.054  0.389  (0.0550)  0.193  2.013
R-squared 0.5097 0.3954
Adj R-squared 0.4313 0.2986
Durbin--Watson  statistic 2.1400 1.8504
F-statistic  6.4980  4.0866
Prob (F-Sta.)  0.000995  0.011033
Number of  ﬁrms  107
Source:  Own elaboration.
*p ≤ 0.1.
** p ≤ 0.05.
*** p ≤ 0.005.
Table  6  Model  2  results.
Variables  Results  of  Model  2  to  index  and  ROE  Results  of  Model  2  to  index  and  ROA
Coefﬁcient  Std.  error  T-statistic  Coefﬁcient  Std.  error  T-statistic
ROE  0.003  (0.0035)*** 0.001 3.210  0.016  (0.0155)** 0.006  2.590
LNASSET 0.0580  (0.109) 0.021  2.743  0.066  (0.0050)*** 0.022  3.066
C 0.247  (0.2249) 0.199 1.243  0.147  (0.4751)  0.203  0.725
AR(1) 0.343  (0.0852) 0.192  1.789  0.341  (0.0918)  0.195  1.751
R-squared 0.5539  0.5047
Adj R-squared 0.5024  0.4476
Durbin--Watson  statistic  1.7600  1.8170
F-statistic  10.7605  8.8318
Prob (F-Sta)  0.000089  0.000332
Number of  ﬁrms  107
Source:  Own elaboration.
*p ≤ 0.1.
** p ≤ 0.05.
*** p ≤ 0.005.
Table  7  Veriﬁcation  of  models’  hypotheses.
Study  results  Model  1  Model  2
Hypothesis  1.1  (+GRI  implies  +  FP)  Veriﬁed  with  ROA  and  ROE
Hypothesis  1.2  (+DJSI  implies  +  FP)  Not  veriﬁed
Hypothesis  1.3  (+COMPL  RECOM  implies  +  FP)  Veriﬁed  with  ROA  and  ROE
Hypothesis  1.4  (+GC  implies  +  FP)  Not  veriﬁed
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THypothesis  2  (+FP  implies  +  Social  Behaviour  Index)  
In  spite  of  these  positive  results  we  acknowledge  there
re  certain  limitations  in  our  research.  First,  the  limited  geo-
raphical  and  temporal  scope.  Second,  as  a  consequence  of
he  bidirectional  relationship,  a  feedback  circle  is  gener-
ted  between  social  and  ﬁnancial  variables,  and  it  is  not
ltogether  clear  which  come  ﬁrst.
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onclusions and future directions for research
his  study  has  demonstrated,  as  expected,  that  the  social
s  proﬁtable,  and  the  proﬁtable  is  social,  thereby  forming  a
irtuous  circle  as  suggested  by  Surroca  et  al.  (2010).  That  is,
ocially  responsible  policies  transform  into  higher  proﬁts  and
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higher  proﬁts  transform  into  socially  responsible  policies.
This  bidirectional  relationship  in  CSR--FP  has  proven  positive
in  both  directions.  Hence,  in  economic  terms,  we  afﬁrm  that
for  ﬁrms,  ceteris  paribus,  increasing  CSR  outlays  leads  to
an  improved  FP,  and  withal,  ﬁrms  enjoying  greater  ﬁnancial
strength  present  an  improved  Social  Behaviour  Index.  This
generates  positive  mutual  feedback  that  encourages  ﬁrms  to
(1)  apply  CSR  policies  with  their  ﬁnancial  resources,  and  (2)
verify  how  their  CSR  investments  lead  to  improved  ﬁnancial
returns.
Furthermore,  from  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  the  lit-
erature  revision  has  introduced  distinct  theories:  agency,
stewardship,  resources  dependency  and  institutional  per-
spective;  in  certain  postulates  they  may  be  applied  to
the  models  of  our  analysis.  However,  our  empirical  results
conﬁrm  that  stakeholder  theory  provides  the  most  solid
foundation  for  the  complete  study.  The  CSR-FP  bidirectional
relationship  demonstrates  that  all  interest  groups  derive
beneﬁts  in  some  way  or  another.  In  addition,  the  normative
and  instrumental  approaches  of  this  theory  are  also  satis-
ﬁed  by  the  outcome  of  this  work;  the  former  because  the
recommendations  of  Good  Corporate  Governance  as  an  ele-
ment  of  CSR  undoubtedly  generate  beneﬁts;  the  latter  by
conﬁrming  and  consolidating  the  relative  importance  given
by  the  companies  to  the  different  areas  of  CSR,  a  function
of  the  priority  assigned  to  each  of  the  interest  groups.
We  believe  the  contribution  of  this  work  to  be  important
for  the  following  reasons:  ﬁrst,  because  of  the  original  com-
bination  of  variables  to  assess  CSR,  based  on  the  valuation
of  GRI,  inclusion  in  the  DJSI  index  (Dow  Jones  Sustainability
Index),  compliance  with  the  recommendations  of  good  CG,
and  whether  the  company  is  a  signee  of  the  Global  Compact;
second,  because  the  variable  referring  to  CG,  albeit  enjoying
widespread  backing,  had  never  been  used  in  an  empiri-
cal  study  in  Spain;  and  ﬁnally,  because  we  performed  the
direct  and  the  reverse  analysis,  posing  the  question  in  terms
of  whether  the  ﬁnancial  results  obtained  by  Spanish  com-
panies  have  an  impact  on  their  social  behavior  and  vice
versa.
An  important  and  novel  conclusion  in  this  Spanish  case
relates  to  the  CG  variable  as  no  study  had  previously
included  the  compliance  with  good  government  as  a  compo-
nent  element  in  measuring  company  CSR.  From  the  positive
correlation  existing  between  this  variable  and  the  ratios  ROE
and  ROA  we  may  conclude  that  the  existing  mechanisms  that
regulate  the  operation  of  the  boards  of  directors  can  serve  as
a  guide  to  shareholders  and  investors  in  making  their  invest-
ment  decisions;  likewise,  socially  responsible  investments
will  be  bolstered  by  the  ethical  and  respectful  behaviors
conforming  to  the  principles  outlined  by  UCGG.
Although  no  single  internationally  implemented  legal
mechanism  exists  to  regulate  the  behavior  of  company
boards  of  directors,  the  Spanish  UCGG  possesses  a  large
number  of  concordances  between  its  recommendations
and  both  the  OECD’s  Principles  of  CG,  and  other  recom-
mendations  of  the  European  Commission.  Even  if  some
recommendations  are  presently  being  challenged,  as  for
example  that  the  same  individual  act  as  company  CEO  while
simultaneously  holding  the  position  of  chairman  of  the  board
of  directors,  we  understand  that  this  study  in  adding  to  the
knowledge  base  at  the  international  level  facilitates  further
research  --  when  taking  as  variable  CG  --  of  CSR  and  FP.
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In  light  of  our  results,  company  observance  with  the
uideline  of  the  GRI  is  highly  recommended.  Applying  the
rinciples  of  the  GRI  when  presenting  sustainability  reports
ssures  ﬁnancial  advantages,  and  by  extrapolation  all  stake-
olders  stand  to  beneﬁt.
From  an  academic  standpoint,  we  would  like  to  draw
ttention  to  the  importance  for  corporations  to  comply  with
he  recommendations  of  good  CG  and  the  GRI  guideline.  We
tress  the  relevance  for  the  board  of  directors  to  consider
hat  social  policies  form  an  integral  part  of  overall  company
trategy.  Boards  should  feel  emboldened  to  adopt  such  poli-
ies  as  they  feedback  into  increased  proﬁtability  and  boost
verall  corporate  visibility.
Future  research  should  aim  to  resolve  which  of  the
wo  variables,  CSR  or  ﬁnancial  proﬁtability,  initiates  the
SR  economic  proﬁtability  cycle,  or  more  speciﬁcally,  clar-
fy  if  proﬁtable  companies  invest  in  CSR  and  in  so  doing
ain  an  additional  advantage  that  translates  into  improved
conomic  returns,  or  on  the  contrary,  companies  exercis-
ng  socially  responsible  behaviors  obtain  better  economic
eturns.  As  business  strategies  focus  over  the  long-term,
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he  board  of  directors,  in  following  the  recommendations
f  good  CG,  represents  the  starting  point  for  the  application
f  CSR  to  business  decision-making  as  it  strives  to  enrich
ociety  as  a  whole.
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